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CAN NON-STATE CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS BOLSTER
STATE-CENTERED EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM?
Kelly Levin*
Benjamin Cashore**
JonathanKoppell *

INTRODUCTION

Increasing economic globalization has coincided with the
emergence and escalating influence of non-state actors and
organizations in domestic and international policymaking, from

shaping policy agendas to promoting private authority.' The latter
phenomenon has arisen, at least in part, from a critique of states'
failures to adopt effective and enduring environmental policies.
Rather than contest "command and control" institutions, non-state
strategies embrace market approaches built around incentives and
Several forms of non-state authority have
price mechanisms.2
emerged, including corporate social responsibility, provision of
information through labeling, and self-reporting.3
Associate, Climate and Energy Program, World Resources Institute.
Professor of Environmental Governance & Political Science, Yale
University School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
*** Associate Professor of Politics and Management, Yale University School
of Management; Director, Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and
Performance, Yale University.
The authors would like to thank, for their comments on previous versions
of this Article, participants at the New Frontiers in Global Environmental
Governance workshop at the University of Waterloo (January 2009), the Wake
Forest Law Review's Business Law Symposium on Corporate Governance and
Climate Change (March 2009), and the Science Po/IDDRI seminar on new forms
of environmental governance (May 2009). For their specific and thoughtful
comments, we thank Peter Christensen, Steven Bernstein, Laurent Mermet,
St6phane Gu6neau, and Cyril Loisel.
1. Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private
Authority in the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J.
Biersteker eds., 2002).
*

**

2. Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social
Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest

Products Fields, 31 POL. & Soc'Y 433, 433-34 (2003).
3. Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global
Governance Be Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE
347,347-48 (2007).
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This Article focuses on a specific institutional formation within
private authority-non-state market-driven ("NSMD") global
governance, 4 commonly referred to as global certification programs.
Certification schemes are distinctive, according to Bernstein and
Cashore, because they transform the global marketplace by
developing "deliberative and adaptive governance institutions
designed to embed social and environmental norms in the global
marketplace that derive authority directly from interested
audiences, including those they seek to regulate, not from sovereign
states."5 As Hall and Biersteker have noted, in such processes nonstate actors undertake functions traditionally associated as
exclusive to state policy making activities: they "set agendas, they
establish boundaries or limits for action .... and they provide order
and security.... [They also] act simultaneously both in the domestic
and in the international arenas."' Five features separate the NSMD
system from other non-state policy mechanisms: (1) its authority is
not derived from the state, (2) there are institutionalized governance
mechanisms, (3) the authority is market based, (4) its policy arena is
the social domain, and (5) there exist enforcement mechanisms and
mandatory requirements.7 NSMD global governance first emerged
in 1993 in the forestry sector and has subsequently arisen in
numerous other sectors, such as ecotourism, coffee, fisheries, organic
foods, and aquarium species. 8 Given that these schemes do not rely
on state sovereign authority, NSMD certification programs must
cultivate sufficient private authority and legitimacy to govern on
their own.'

4. BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST
CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 4 (2004).

5.
6.
7.
note 3,

Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 3, at 348.
Hall & Biersteker, supra note 1, at 4.
See CASHORE ETAL., supra note 4, at 17, 20; Bernstein & Cashore, supra
at 361; Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of

Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance
Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503, 503-04.
8. CASHORE ET AL., supra note 4, at 5, 11-12.
9. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The
Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental
Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297, 302 (2007).
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TABLE 1: KEY FEATURES OF NSMD GOVERNANCE' 0

Role of the state

State does not use its sovereign authority to
directly require adherence to rules

Institutionalized
governance
mechanism
The social domain

Procedures in place designed to created [sic]
adaptation, inclusion, and learning over time
across a wide range of stakeholders
Rules govern environmental and social
problems
Support emanates from producers and
consumers along the supply chain who
evaluate the costs and benefits of joining
Compliance must be verified

Role of the market
Enforcement

Recent research on NSMD systems has focused on identifying
possible "futures" of the model in an effort to focus scholarship on
understanding how such non-state programs might evolve to gain
the legitimacy and authority to govern;" such futures include the
following possibilities: (1) NSMD systems gain "full-fledged political
legitimacy," (2) NSMD systems exist as "strong, but niche or smallmarket-focused" systems, (3) NSMD systems institutionalize "as a
weak system," (4) hybrids emerge that combine government and
private authority,
and (5) governments move in to regulate the
12
problem.

We focus our attention on an overlooked future alternative that
we characterize as symbiotic to describe a particular relationship
between public and private authority. The key feature of a
symbiotic relationship is that NSMD certification is used to address
unforeseen or undesired externalities of an existing government or
intergovernmental agreement.
Such an approach avoids the
situation in which hard-won intergovernmental or domestic public
policy agreements have to be revisited-something that a plethora of
literature tells us rarely occurs quickly, if at all, and that comes
with huge risks, including backsliding from commitments. By
addressing such externalities in the marketplace, successful NSMD
systems would work in symbiotic fashion to increase the legitimacy
and support of the intergovernmental or public policy agreement10. Benjamin Cashore et al., The Emergence of Non-State Environmental
Governance in European and North American Forest Sectors, in TRANSATLANTIC
ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY POLITICS 209, 214 (Miranda A. Schreurs et al. eds.,
2009) (adapted from Cashore, supra note 7, at 509).
11. See generally Graeme Auld et al., The Emergence of Non-State MarketDriven (NSMD) Global Environmental Governance: A Cross-Sectoral
Assessment, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 183

(Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009); Bernstein & Cashore, supra
note 3.
12. Auld et al., supra note 11, at 190, 192.
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entrenching, rather than taking away from, state-centered
processes.
When and how might symbiotic relationships emerge? What
precise organizational forms might they take? How do authority
and legitimacy requirements for NSMD systems differ from the
ideal-type "political legitimacy" future identified by Bernstein and
Cashore?13 The purpose of this Article is to shed light on these
questions so that practitioners and scholars may be able to draw on
the full range of impacts that NSMD systems might have. In the
symbiotic forms we explore, governmental arrangements effectively
integrate NSMD efforts, and NSMD systems complement statebased commitments, thus reinforcing the status of both parties,
instead of seeing them as in competition. We illustrate the potential
of symbiotic relationships by reviewing the emergence of the Gold
Standard certification program for carbon projects,'4 which provides
us with a case study to explore such a symbiotic arrangement.
Rather than reopening the negotiation process, the developers of the
Gold Standard used certification as a means to target environmental
and social aspects of carbon-reduction targets that had not been
included in the Kyoto Protocol.' 5 We argue that the path toward
gaining legitimacy for NSMD systems under such a relationship is
very different from the conditions Bernstein and Cashore posited in
their 2007 article.' 6 Answering and understanding the questions
posed above will allow us to assess the merits and potential of such
a design as an approach to global environmental governance.
The remainder of this Article elaborates these points. Following
this Introduction, Part I outlines an analytical framework by
Bernstein and Cashore regarding the evolutionary future of NSMD
governance. Part II introduces our empirical case study-the Clean
Development Mechanism's Gold Standard-which we use to explore
the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between public and
private authority, and Part III addresses the future of the Gold
Standard. Part IV addresses the advantages of symbiotic NSMD
initiatives. Part V discusses the implications of the symbiotic
relationship with regard to its legitimacy and authority
requirements, and Part VI discusses the design of effective global
environmental governance. We conclude by identifying the need for
better integration of scholarship on private authority, public policy,
intergovernmental relations, and corporate governance.

13. Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 3, at 351.
14. For a discussion of the Gold Standard, see Part II.
15. Only projects eligible for certification as Clean Development
Mechanisms as defined under the Kyoto Protocol, which was created by a
multilateral state-based process, can meet Gold Standard requirements.
16. Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 3, at 354-62.
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I. THEORIZING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF NSMD

Bernstein and Cashore's three-stage process for NSMD
institutionalization and acquisition of legitimacy serves as a
launching pad for this investigation (Diagram 1).
DIAGRAM 1: THE THREE PHASES OF NSMD GOVERNANCE 17

[:

Phase
Initiation

Phase II:VWidcspread Support

]

I

Phase IIk:
Politicaf Legitimacy
.. ...
I

NOOs
NGOs

Bernstein and Cashore argue that to gain authority, the NSMD
system must first achieve "political legitimacy," which they define as
an "acceptance [and justification] of shared rule by a community as
appropriate and justified."'8 In turn, they identify a three-stage
process for institutionalization and acquisition of legitimacy,
through which NSMD systems will proceed in an attempt to succeed
in governing. The following outlines the three stages of their
argument.

19

Phase I: Initiation- In Phase I, firms that are early actors, that
have been publicly shamed or boycotted, or that already meet a
substantial number of the standard's criteria will join the scheme.
In this initiation phase, economic demand for participation in the
NSMD system is not sufficient to spur membership. Bernstein and
Cashore claim that Phase I will result in a niche market, where
firms and environmental/social stakeholders will act in their own
interests and widespread support among the sector's firms will not

17.
18.
19.

Id. at 356.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347-7 1.
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be achieved.,0
Phase II: Building Widespread Support - The key feature of
Phase II is the initial relaxation of standards (in the absence of price
premiums and demand), as firms who have yet to join will not do so
until standards are weakened. If the standards are not diluted, the
system is likely to attract only a niche market, as in Phase I,
because the firms that have yet to conform likely have higher costs
in meeting the standards. If the architects of the NSMD system
refuse to lower standards, one consequence, which has been
observed with certification of the forest sector, may be the
development of competing standards by industry firms and
associations. This will lead to a "divergence" of standards and a
resultant polarization of the landscape of firm behavior. Through
shared learning, heightened public awareness, and competition,
these standards may converge again at later stages. Upon reaching
Phase II, Bernstein and Cashore identify three paths forward: (1)
governments are finally engaged and regulate as a result of public
awareness and significant contest among firms (in this scenario, the
NSMD system is disbanded); (2) divergence continues, with periodic
episodes of convergence, but firms seek "exit strategies" and
widespread support is not achieved; or (3) institutionalization and
achievement of legitimacy of NSMD systems, advancing to the final
stage, or Phase 111.21
Phase III: PoliticalLegitimacy - In Phase III, the NSMD system
gains the widespread support of stakeholders, including
representatives from business, social, and environmental interests.
The sector's stakeholders look to NSMD governance "as [a]
legitimate arena[] in which to mediate disputes and address policy
problems."22 In Phase III, the NSMD system has gained political
legitimacy and can become institutionalized. Bernstein and Cashore
claim that this third
23 phase is the most important and ultimate goal
of NSMD systems.

To be effective, NSMD systems must gain and maintain
widespread support among firms involved in each step of the supply
chain/project development. Bernstein and Cashore's framework
explores only the scenario in which the ultimate goal of the NSMD
system is to gain private authority through the acquisition of
"political legitimacy." While other efforts have built upon the
framework to identify a variety of other possible futures, little
attention has been placed on assessing their evolutionary logics or
dynamics of collaboration.
We argue that an institutional
arrangement featuring such a relationship might require a different
legitimization process than the one described by Bernstein and
20. Id. at 355-57.

21. Id. at 357-61.
22. Id. at 361.
23. Id. at 349.
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Cashore. In the following Part, we describe the genesis of the Gold
Standard. This case study will be used to explore the evolution of
on the distinctive
symbiotic arrangements, with particular 2emphasis
4
Phase III-pursuit of political legitimacy.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE GOLD STANDARD
The Gold Standard certification program validates whether or
not emission-reduction projects under the Kyoto Protocol adequately
address nonclimate environmental and sustainable-development
Reduction projects eligible for Gold Standard
concerns. 25
certification are Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM") projects,
the only abatement projects under the Kyoto Protocol carried out in
developing countries.2 6 The CDM was defined under Article 12 of
the Kyoto Protocol as a flexible policy instrument in which "Annex I"
Parties (developed countries that have ratified the Protocol and
adhere to reduction targets) can partner with "non-Annex I" Parties
(developing countries that have ratified but are exempt from
targets) in emission reduction activities.2 7 In other words, it is a
mechanism by which developed countries can meet their carbon
reduction targets by promoting "clean development" in other (less
Such projects effectively substitute for
developed) nations.
reduction of carbon emissions in the developed countries. For
example, a CDM project has recently been approved in Hubei
Province, China to develop a hydropower station to supply 57,440
MWh annually.
The electricity generated will replace the
generation from existing thermal power plants connected to the
same electricity grid.28
According to the Kyoto Protocol language, an additional purpose
of the CDM-beyond assisting Annex I Parties in meeting their
reduction targets-is to promote sustainable-development benefits
for non-Annex I Parties.2 9 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol states
that:

24. Id. at 361.
25. THE GOLD STANDARD, THE GOLD STANDARD BROCHURE (2007), available
at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/lcommunication
/brochure/GS_brochure_2007.pdf [hereinafter THE GOLD STANDARD BROCHURE].
26. ENERGY & ENV'T GROUP, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, THE CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: A USER'S GUIDE at 5 (2003) [hereinafter CDM USER'S
GUIDE].

27. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 12, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Clean
Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form, July 28, 2006,
at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagementlFileStorage
available
/NYILEP2ZHDX8WCAB97RGFOQ6OV15JT.
29. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 27, art. 12.
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The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to
assist Parties not included in [the] Annex I in achieving
sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate
objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in
Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article
3.30

The impetus behind inclusion of sustainable development
benefits was the realization that projects invested in developing
countries have the potential not only to reduce global greenhouse
gases in a cost-effective manner, but also to contribute to the
improvement of conditions in the developing nations.31 Yet some
projects (e.g., fuel switching, which can have ancillary benefits of
reducing local air pollutants) are able to generate more sustainabledevelopment
benefits
than
others
(e.g.,
reduction
of
32
hydrofluorocarbon ("HFC") releases).
Since its inception, the CDM program has generated
considerable criticism, varying from complaints regarding the
lengthy credit-issuance process to complaints concerning the lack of
standardized baseline and monitoring methodologies to complaints
addressing the deficiency of financial and personnel support for the
CDM Executive Board. 33 Additionally, many have criticized the
CDM progress to date, claiming that few sustainable development
benefits have actually resulted from the Mechanism.3 4 Moreover,
non-climate environmental benefits, such as the preservation of
biodiversity, have not been a priority for CDM project developers.
While the standards of the CDM take into account the project's
ability to offset carbon emissions, they can ignore or even negatively
impact environmental and sustainable development concerns.35 The
Gold Standard certification program aims to address these perceived
weaknesses and is the first independent benchmark for CDM best
practices.16
The Gold Standard specifically addresses the concerns of
environmental and nongovernmental social organizations that have
noted that the CDM does not guarantee environmental integrity and
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. HARMUT STAHL ET AL., FED. INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS'N, GREEN
GOAL LEGACY REPORT 86 (Christa Friedl ed., Michael Gromm trans., 2006),
available at http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/292/2006-011-en.pdf.
32. Aaron Cosbey et al., Realizing the Development Dividend: Making the
CDM Work for Developing Countries 9 (May 2005) (unpublished document on
file with The International Institute for Sustainable Development).
33. Id. at 60-61.
34. Id. at 9-10; Mark Kenber, Senior Policy Officer, WWF Climate Change
Programme at Terra Tec, Leipzig: Quality Standards for CDM and JI Projects
under Domestic and Regional Trading Regimes (2003).
35. Cosbey et al., supra note 32, at 13-17.
36. THE WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE GOLD STANDARD-BACKGROUND AND
OVERVIEW (2003) [hereinafter

GOLD STANDARD BACKGROUND].
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sustainable development benefits. According to such organizations,
the environmental weaknesses include: (1) a lack of sufficient
definition of "additionality," which can lead to no net reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions, as business-as-usual projects are granted
credits; (2) potential non-climate impacts adverse to such
environmental concerns as biodiversity and ecosystem conservation,
as large-scale hydroelectric power and monocropping projects are
eligible under the CDM; (3) perpetuation of non-renewable energy
sources, as fossil fuel projects can generate credits; and (4)
inadequate standardization of environmental impact assessments
before project initiation.3' Critics note that project developers are
likely to gravitate to the least expensive reduction activities, which
may have the least impact.38
Additionally, the geographic distribution of CDM investment
does not fulfill the Kyoto Protocol's goal of delivering projects
equitably. A significant percentage of credits lie in Brazil, India,
and Chile alone, and there are only a handful in the pipeline from
Africa, most of which are being developed in the wealthiest African
country, South Africa.3 9 While foreign investment will naturally
gravitate towards stable democracies with established institutions
and low risk, the Mechanism does not take any safeguards to avoid
the imbalanced distribution.4 °
It has been argued that the perceived failures to develop
sustainable development benefits stem from (1) insufficient
stakeholder processes, as comment periods are too short and hostcountry stakeholders often lack Internet access and/or language
capabilities to review project design documents; 41 (2) prohibitive
costs of small-scale projects, which often lead to greater sustainable
development benefits, despite the abridged requirements for these
projects;4 2 and (3) the absence of a definition of "sustainable
development," which creates obstacles to the evaluation of project
benefits.43
Given this criticism, the CDM may not be able to rid itself of
uncertainty, which will affect investor decisions and deflate the
price of CDM credits. In addition, project investors will face

37. Kenber, supra note 34; THE WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE GOLD
STANDARD: QUALITY STANDARDS FOR CDM AND JI PROJECTS 6 (2002) [hereinafter
GOLD STANDARD QUALITY STANDARDS].

38. Cosbey et al., supra note 32, at 20; Michael Schlup, Dir., The Gold
Standard, Address at Climate or Development? International Conference at the
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (Oct. 28-29, 2005).
39. Cosbey et al., supra note 32, at 26.
40. Id.
41. GOLD STANDARD QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 5.
42. Corinne Boone, Managing Dir., CantorCO2e, Address at the United
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 11 and CMP 1): Structuring
Voluntary Emission Reduction Transactions-What Buyers Want (2005).
43. Cosbey et al., supra note 32, at 50.
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heightened political and reputational risks as the lack of confidence
in environmental integrity and sustainable development assistance
undermines their investments.44
Most fundamentally, because
investors do not have clarity in "additionality rules," they cannot be
assured that credits will amount to real emission reductions.4 5 In
light of these risks and the aforementioned failures of the CDM to
safeguard sustainable-development and environmental benefits, the
need for additional clarification of the standards for bona fide CDM
projects that result in sustainable development benefits was
obvious.
A.

The Emergence of the Gold Standard as a Solution

The World Wide Fund for Nature (CWWF"), a non-governmental
organization active in international climate change policy, initiated
the Gold Standard in 2002. 46 Today, the Gold Standard is an
independent organization governed by an advisory board and
steering committee. 47 To qualify for Gold Standard certification,
project developers must generate emission reduction projects that
are not only recognized by the CDM governing body, known as the
Executive Board, but also meet the Gold Standard's criteria. 84 Thus,
the projects must satisfy criteria put forward by both the public
authority, which in this case is the CDM Executive Board, and the
private authority established by the Gold Standard.
The Gold Standard has created three screens-project type,
baseline and additionality, and sustainable development-for
project approval. Thus, projects that seek approval from the Gold
Standard must not only fulfill the CDM criteria but must also
proceed through the Standard's criteria presented in the three
screens. 49
If a project passes through all three screens, it can
advance to verification and eventual sale.
For example, a
microsolar-lantern project in Zambia has recently been accredited
with the Gold Standard. The project reduces the need for kerosene,
and it trains Zambian locals to build the lanterns and lightbulbs as
well as sources the materials locally when possible." Gold Standard
projects can be sold within the compliance scheme to Annex I
countries as well as to non-compliance parties (e.g., a sporting event
offsetting its greenhouse-gas emissions).51
44. GOLD STANDARD QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 37, at 6.

45. See

STAHL ET AL.,

supra note 31, at 86.

46. GOLD STANDARD BACKGROUND, supra note 36.
47. THE GOLD STANDARD, THE GOLD STANDARD MANUAL FOR CDM PROJECT
DEVELOPERS 5 (2006).
48. THE GOLD STANDARD BROCHURE, supra note 25, at 5.
49. Id. at 5, 13.
50. The Gold Standard, Product Registry, https://gsl.apx.com/myModule
/rpt/myrpt.asp?r=lll (last visited Sept. 2, 2009).
51. The
Gold
Standard,
Certifying
GS
Carbon
Credits,
http://wwwcdmgoldstandard.org/Certifying-GS-Carbon-Credits. 112.0.html (last
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Thus, in contrast to certification programs in other sectors, the
Gold Standard has the unique objective of augmenting existing
public policy requirements. Moreover, the Gold Standard relies on
public policy processes and intergovernmental agreements. A key
purpose of the CDM was to promote non-carbon environmental and
social values that might be compromised by projects focusing on
carbon. Hence, if the parties to the Kyoto Protocol were to do away
with the CDM Mechanism, the status of the Gold Standard as a
mechanism to internalize CDM externalities would be ambiguous at
best.
Promoters of the Gold Standard rely upon market incentives to
encourage project buyers to support their NSMD systems. It is
argued that investment in projects meeting the more rigorous Gold52
risks
Standard criteria present lower financial and reputational
Reputational risk is particularly important to buyers on the
voluntary, or noncompliance, market, as they are often buying offset53
scrutiny.
projects to become visible leaders or to satisfy public
Research on voluntary versus compliance carbon-credit markets
reveals that the highest prices of credits are associated with
government-mandated projects.54 Voluntary programs, where many
have voiced widespread concerns about leakage or adequate
55
Yet the
accounting, generate credits that fetch the lowest prices.
same research finds that certification of voluntary approaches
increases credibility that the carbon sequestration or reductions are
real, which, as we would expect, pushes the price 56of certified
prices.
voluntary markets closer to the state compliance
An important additional consideration should be noted: the
credits bought on the voluntary market will be "retired." This
means they cannot be used by Annex I countries to meet reduction
targets.5 7 This results in an increase in the price of available credits
as supply is tightened, making investment in direct carbonemissions reduction the cost-effective approach.
B.

Support

The Gold Standard has piqued several buyers' interest. For
example, the FIFA World Cup held in Germany in 2006 offset its
visited June 12, 2009).
52.
53.

GOLD STANDARD BACKGROUND, supra note 36.
THE GOLD STANDARD BROCHURE, supra note 25,

at 5, 13.

54. Matthew Kotchen, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Cal., Santa Barbara,
Address at the Federal Trade Commission's Workshop on Carbon Offsets and
Renewable Energy Certificates: An Economics Perspective on the Market for
Voluntary Carbon Offsets (Jan. 8, 2008).
55. Katherine Hamilton, Navigating a Nebula: Institutional Use of the
United States' Voluntary Carbon Market (May 18, 2006) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Yale University) (on file with Natural Capitalism Solutions).
56. Kotchen, supra note 54.
57.

GOLD STANDARD QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note

37, at 4.
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emissions with Gold Standard credits. Virgin Atlantic offers its
passengers the choice to offset their flight-related emissions through
the Gold Standard program."' In addition, several governments
have chosen to offset their emissions with Gold Standard credits.5 9
When the United Kingdom held the presidency of the G8, emissions
associated with its meetings were offset by Gold Standard reduction
projects. 60 Additionally, the eleventh Conference of the Parties of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, first
Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol, held in December of
2005, offset some emissions with Gold Standard credits. 6' The Gold
Standard project linked with the 2005 meeting involved 430 tons of
credit generated through a project in Honduras.62 The revenue from
the carbon credits will be used to create a computer department at
the local school; the electricity generated will be sold to the local
grid; and waste products will be used for fertilization and irrigation.
Environment Canada, responsible for offsetting the conference's
emissions, stated that their purchase of Gold Standard credits had
multiple rationales: to support the voluntary market, to meet
stakeholder expectations and pressure from nongovernmental
organizations, to gain both environmental and sustainable livelihood
ancillary benefits, and to reduce risk.63
On the supply side, as of September 2008, the Gold Standard
had over two hundred validated greenhouse gas reduction projects
in its registry from over thirty countries. Its projects represent
roughly 15 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.64

58. Press Release, Virgin Atlantic Airlines, Virgin Atlantic to Debut InFlight
Carbon
Offset
Scheme
(Nov.
8,
2007),
available at
http://www.brandrepublic.com/News/765404/Virgin-Atlantic-debut-in-flight
-carbon-offset-scheme/.
59. Press Release, The Gold Standard, Gold Standard Registry Experiences
Rapid Growth in Carbon Market Projects and Users (Sept. 10, 2008), available
at
http://ww.apx.com/news/pr-Gold-Standard-Registry-Experiences-Rapid
-Growth.asp.
60. Press Release, The Gold Standard, UK Makes Commitment to Gold
Standard,
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/UK-Renews-Commitment.310.0
.html (last visited June 12, 2009).
61. According to Blaine Mohinger of Environment Canada, the government
had already brokered a deal with the Pembina Institute to offset its emissions;
therefore, it could only buy a portion from the Gold Standard. Blaine Mohinger,
Env't Can., Address at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 11
and MOP 1): Offsetting the COP/MOP (2005).
62. Bearing Hopes and Fears, Delegates Gather for UN Climate Talks,
ENV'T NEWS SERV., Nov. 28, 2005, http://www.ens-newswire.conmens/nov2005

/2005-11-28-01.asp.
63. Mohinger, supra note 61.
64. Press Release, The Gold Standard, supra note 59.
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III. FUTURE OF THE GOLD STANDARD: THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE
SYMBIOTIC NSMD RELATIONSHIP

In terms of the Bernstein/C ashore analytical framework, the
Gold Standard currently remains in Phase I. The pool of compliant
projects in development is still quite small, and in many regards the
Gold Standard is attractive only to a niche market. "Green" events
and companies are buying Gold Standard offsets, and they can be
classified as early adopters, typical Phase I actors.6 In addition,
participating Gold Standard buyers are associated with
The
governments that are attempting to lead by example.66
prominence of these "role models" is actually an indicator that the
Gold Standard has not yet gained widespread recognition and
support.
The Gold Standard experience to date does not appear markedly
different from that of the typical NSMD system in Phase I. It is
logical to assume that the relationship with the Kyoto Protocol
helped the Gold Standard clear a threshold of credibility much more
quickly than NSMD systems without the governmental connection.
However, to the extent that the success of the standard ultimately
depends on market value being attached to compliance, this
advantage may only pertain to the initial stages of NSMD
development. Indeed, the slow adoption of the Gold Standard is
indicative of the typical challenges associated with gaining
acceptance for a new standard.
If the Gold Standard were to progress to Phase II, Bernstein
and Cashore posit that it would likely have to lower its
requirements in an attempt to lure more firms (unless the market
incentives changed for some exogenous reason).67 It remains to be
seen which aspects of the Gold Standard are of highest burden, and,
accordingly, which would have to be weakened. In Phase II, the
NSMD system often faces competing 68standards developed by
Competing certification
industry interests or civil society groups.
schemes design standards in an effort to gain widespread support,
and as a result, there is potential overlap, confusion, and erosion of
confidence in all standards. Bernstein and Cashore argue that the
emergence of norms in a community (following a "logic of
appropriateness") might provide force to countervail pressures for
divergence and fragmentation.69
It is difficult to evaluate the potential for competition among
carbon offset certification programs at this stage in the development
of the Gold Standard. However, there is reason to posit that the
Phase II dynamics are different for NSMD systems that are part of a
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 3, at 355-57.
THE GOLD STANDARD, PREMIUM QUALITY CARBON
Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 3, at 357.
Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 358.
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symbiotic relationship with an intergovernmental (or governmental)
entity. Specifically, the official recognition of the symbiotic NSMD
system constitutes a formidable barrier to entry for prospective
standard makers. Any group considering the development of a rival
standard-regardless of motive-is likely to recognize the advantage
enjoyed by the Gold Standard. This may deter competitors and
allow the Gold Standard to avoid the downward pressure associated
with Phase II. As discussed below, this dynamic might alternatively
be seen as NSMD legitimization through formal governmental
recognition.
To be clear, the competitive advantage of the symbiotic NSMD
system is more than that enjoyed by the prototypical "first mover"
(although that too is enjoyed by the Gold Standard). The association
between the NSMD system and the governmental entity provides a
qualitative differentiation for the Gold Standard. This ought to be
seen as a comparative advantage for the Gold Standard versus
competitors or potential competitors.
What might Phase III look like for the Gold Standard? Many
certification systems have been developed to fill a void in public
policy. Their creators attempt to bypass public authority altogether
and gain legitimacy to serve only as non-state authority.]
Yet the
Gold Standard was developed as a mechanism to promote certain
effective impacts of an existing government policy-rather than to
fill a void. At no point does the Gold Standard undermine the
legitimacy and authority of the CDM Executive Board. Whereas the
traditional NSMD certification programs are not constrained by
public policy, the Gold Standard requires project developers to meet
CDM criteria in advance of certification. 7" The validity of the Gold
Standard as an extension of the CDM program is underscored by the
states that have signed on to the Kyoto Protocol. Governments have
already demonstrated interest in ensuring that their offsets meet
Gold Standard criteria. 72 And while at the moment, Gold Standard
credits are being bought only on the voluntary market, one could
imagine a Phase III scenario in which Annex I (developed) countries
under the Kyoto Protocol buy only Gold Standard credits to meet
their targets.
This complex relationship between private and public authority
suggests several possible "futures" for the Gold Standard. The Gold
Standard could remain in a niche market, catering to government
lead-by-example programs and other early actors.
Or the Gold

70. Id. at 361.
71. Most NSMD certification systems do require "adherence" to national
policies, but the actual certification systems focus on policies or standards they
develop, or to a specific subset of government policies that are preidentified by
the certification system.
72. Press Release, The Gold Standard, supra note 60.
73. Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 3, at 357.
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Standard could be formally integrated into the governmental
program (i.e., the Gold Standard successfully transforms the CDM,
with the three screens for social and environmental benefits joining
In this scenario, the Gold
existing CDM project criteria).
Standard's governing powers would formally work in tandem with
the CDM criteria, or they could even, at some point, decide to divest
themselves of the Standard and allow the Standard to become fully
absorbed by the public authority or the CDM Executive Board.
We focus our attention on another possible outcome: the
maturation of the symbiotic relationship between public policy and
NSMD governance into a stable, complementary, reinforcing
companion to the government program. In this scenario, the
voluntary market will come to treat Gold Standard certification of
credits as indispensable, just as the Gold Standard relies on CDM
approval. Most significantly, this would mean that parties seeking
to promote policy objectives could do so by attempting to influence
the certification standard rather than the public policy process.
Interestingly, with the assumption that CDM credits are more
robust than non-CDM credits, this could result in advances in
climate policy within the voluntary sector. As a result, the CDM
market would become tightened as credits bought on7 5the voluntary
market were retired to ensure integrity of reductions.
IV. POTENTIAL OF SYMBIOTIC NSMD INITIATIVES FOR GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

The symbiotic NSMD relationship with the public policy process
offers several potential advantages. First, it could be more efficient
than the state-based process to achieve some of the certification
program's objectives.76 Advancement of the Gold Standard would
not have to contend with hurdles of state sovereignty and face other
barriers associated with the policy process, such as challenges in
implementation. Perhaps most significantly, the use of NSMD
systems in tandem with the public policy process bypasses hurdles
inherent in reopening the negotiating process and possibly
Thus, this model of shared
reengaging in hard-won battles.
problem could hold
environmental
an
public/private management of
governance. As
environmental
global
lessons for the design of
efforts in
non-state
of
Gunningham argues, policy "intersection"
be more
often
can
conjunction with government intervention
desired
achieving
in
effective than a single-instrument approach
74. GOLD STANDARD BACKGROUND, supra note 36.
75. Press Release, U.K. Dep't for the Env't, Food & Rural Affairs, Carbon

Offset Scheme Launched (Sept. 12, 2005).
76. Michael E. Cloghesy, A Corporate Perspective on Globalisation,
Sustainable Development, and Soft Law, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW:
VOLUNTARY

STANDARDS
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GLOBAL

TRADE,

ENVIRONMENT

AND

SOCIAL

GOVERNANCE 323, 328 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
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outcomes. 77
He argues that a greater range of actors in
policymaking can relieve governments' limited financial and
personnel resources while yielding broader support and legitimacy
from civil society and those being regulated.
He suggests,
"[t]ogether, and in conjunction with state action, they [state and
non-state governance] achieved far more than State action alone

was ever likely to.",78

Thus, the symbiotic-governance model could

prove to be a desirable goal for NSMD systems and could inform the
design of environmental-governance schemes more broadly.
V. LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY REQUIREMENTS OF A SYMBIOTIC
RELATIONSHIP

Symbiotic NSMD governance mechanisms confront existing
understandings of legitimacy issues governing NSMD ideal types. 79
There are at least five ways in which the legitimacy dynamic for the
symbiotic NSMD system would appear to diverge from that
associated with the conventional stand-alone NSMD system. First,
there is typically a fear that the legitimacy of NSMD systems
undermines state authority and capacity.80
The symbiotic
arrangements pose no such danger. Indeed, the robustness of a
symbiotic NSMD arrangement requires legitimacy of both the state
and non-state elements. Unlike the conventional NSMD system, the
legitimacy of the Gold Standard draws heavily upon the public
authority; its meaning is derived entirely from the CDM of the
Kyoto Protocol. It would be contrary to the goals of the symbiotic
NSMD system to undermine the legitimacy of the state authority."1
The more legitimacy for intergovernmental agreements, such as
those that foster CDM projects, the more support there will be
among governments, civil-society organizations, and project
initiators for NSMD systems to internalize negative externalities.
Similarly, we would expect the legitimacy of intergovernmental
agreements and projects to be enhanced, not detracted from, when
NSMD systems successfully fill the lacunae in the public policy. The
failure of an intergovernmental agreement to capture negative
byproducts of the policy, for example, might cause governments and
civil-society interests to reduce their support for the public policy
efforts. With the NSMD system addressing such shortcomings, the
77.

NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING

417 (1998).
78. Id. at 410.
79. Cashore, supra note 7, at 504.
80. Id. at 510-11.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

81. We note, however, that the mere existence of a symbiotic NSMD may

reduce the legitimacy of those governmental initiatives/projects that are not
involved in the NSMD symbiotic relationship. Hence, we would expect in those
cases that legitimacy would decline from what it otherwise would have been,
but that support of the NSMD system would greatly advance from what it
otherwise would have been. Our thanks to Cyril Loisel for making this point.
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overall policy regime is more stable.
Second, the legitimacy requirements for symbiotic NSMD
systems seem narrower and less challenging than those confronting
This is because symbiotic
the conventional NSMD system.
relationships accept the legitimate authority of the public policy82
to ameliorate.
mechanisms and the problem(s) they are attempting
This stands in contrast to the typical scenario in which skepticism
toward NSMD programs is underscored by the lack of a public
policy. If the problem targeted by the NSMD system is so dire,
members of the doubtful community might ask, why is the
government not doing anything about it? Hence, while symbiotic
NSMD systems must build either pragmatic, moral, or cognitive
legitimacy"3 from those they seek to govern, their legitimacy hurdles
are much lower. In this regard we note that one mechanism
Suchman offers for achieving legitimacy is to mirror an organization
after another one that already has legitimacy. In the case of
symbiotic relationships, such a condition already exists, allowing a
direct link to a culturally ingrained, preexisting "logic of
appropriateness .4
Third, we would expect legitimacy requirements to focus more
on specific mechanisms as to how and what the NSMD system needs
to do, rather than debates about abstract norms regarding the
appropriateness of, say, market versus regulatory instruments.
6
This is important. Both Hall 8 5 and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith"
argue that it is much easier for disparate groups, following internal
learning processes, to agree to "secondary" or "first order" policies
(which include mechanisms for policy implementation and policy
settings) than it is to agree on more value-laden and entrenched
notions surrounding more abstract policy goals and means (such as
the appropriate use of market versus command-and-control
regulations).
Fourth, we expect a symbiotic relationship to reduce the
"competition for legitimacy" that characterizes certification in other
sectors, such as forestry certification. In these cases, as Cashore
and Cashore, Auld, and Newsom have documented, a key empirical
question is understanding how certification programs initiated by
environmental groups on the one hand and industry associations on
the other hand-with different ideas about how prescriptive and
82. Cashore, supra note 7, at 510.
83. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 572 (1995).
84. See James G. Marsh & Johan P. Olsen, The InstitutionalDynamics of
InternationalPolitical Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943, 951 (1998).
85. See generally Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms,Social Learning, and the
State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275 (1993).
86. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith & Paul A. Sabatier, The Dynamics of PolicyOriented Learning, in POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING: AN ADVOCACY COALITION
APPROACH 41, 41-56 (Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993).
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wide-ranging standards ought to be-compete for legitimacy in the
marketplace.8 7
Since the emergence of competitors can seek to
weaken certification programs with higher standards, the lack of
competition will, we expect, leave standards higher than they
otherwise would have been. We theorize that when symbiotic
relationships exist, it is unlikely that a competition for legitimacy
will emerge because the legitimacy requirements for another entity
to enter the field would be very high. 88 This notion was introduced
already in the discussion of the symbiotic NSMD relationship as a
barrier to entry.
There are, to be sure, similar legitimacy requirements as well.
For instance, Cashore, Auld, and Newsom8 9 have found that the
development of self-interested "pragmatic legitimacy" is a necessary
but insufficient requirement if NSMD systems are ultimately to gain
widespread, culturally engrained "cognitive" acceptance or "political
legitimacy." We would expect a similar logic to occur for those
actors supporting the symbiotic NSMD system. Put another way,
even a symbiotic NSMD system must be evaluated by supporters as
being in their strategic self interest, or initial support is unlikely to
occur.
Fifth, the symbiotic arrangement may help the NSMD system
manage the tension between legitimacy and the practical demands
of building and maintaining power that poses a challenge for all
transnational rulemaking bodies.9 ° It remains true that symbiotic
NSMD systems, since they impose constraints on supporters, must
appeal to the interests of the firms and organizations they seek to
govern.
However,
the NSMD
system
linked to
the
intergovernmental regime has two advantages. First, as discussed
above, the linkage provides some prima facie legitimacy, allowing
the NSMD system to bend in the direction of interest satisfaction
without jeopardizing organizational legitimacy. Second, because the
NSMD system is part of a broader framework, the costs to parties
that might walk away if their interests were not fully protected are
higher. This means that the NSMD system may not have to
compromise its normative legitimacy in order to placate key players.
VI. SYMBIOTIC NSMD RELATIONSHIPS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Symbiotic relationships could address a major obstacle for
activists seeking to engage corporate boards as part of an

87. CASHORE ETAL., supra note 4, at 221; Cashore, supra note 7, at 522-23.
88. See CASHORE ET AL., supra note 4, at 229. Particular credit goes to
Jonathan Koppell for making this point.
89. Id. at 34-35.
90. See generally Steven Bernstein, Legitimacy in Global Environmental
Governance, 1 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 139 (2005); Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Global

Governance Organization: Legitimacy and Authority in Conflict, 18 J. PUB.
& THEORY 177, 177-203 (2008).
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environmental strategy. There is a longstanding debate within
corporate governance scholarship regarding the role of the board of
directors. 91 This subject raises both normative and empirical
questions because there has never been agreement on the proper
function of boards-in particular the independent directors-even
though the institution of corporate boards predates regulatory
requirements for their existence. 9 ' Some would see the board's role
narrowly (i.e., hiring and firing the CEO), while others would offer
the board a more expansive role as a partner with management in
shaping corporate strategy in addition to representing the interests
of shareholders and perhaps other stakeholders.93 These debates
stem, in part, from the mixed evidence about what boards actually
do, regardless of the role prescribed by corporate-governance theory
or law. Numerous studies have attempted to address this matter
with an94emphasis on the value added by the existence of corporate
boards.

Both dimensions of the issue have been highlighted by recent
events. In particular, the failures of leading financial institutions
over the last two years have shined a light on corporate boards.
What were the directors doing when management was making
decisions that led to disastrous outcomes? The treatment of this
question reveals the underlying disagreement alluded to in the
preceding paragraph. Some critics have argued that the boards
demonstrably failed, while others argue that the mistakes made by
management were beyond the purview of directors. 9"
The
uncertainty introduced by this episode compounds developments
that have given new urgency to the question of board function.
Even before recent events cast light on corporate boards, groups
with an interest in influencing corporate behavior began focusing on
boards of directors as a strategy that seemed more promising than
appealing to management.96
91. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as
an Endogenously Determined Institution:A Survey of the Economic Literature,9
FED. RES. BOARD OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 7, 10 (2003).
92. Id. at 10.
93. Donald Nordberg, Rebalancing the Board's Agenda: A Discussion Paper
3-4 (May 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social Science
Resource Network), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract

id=989309.
94. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783; Ren6e B. Adams, Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate
Governance: A Conceptual Framework & Survey (Apr. 9, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Social Science Resource Network).
95. Ibolya Balog, Ethics on Their Shoulders: Boards Bear the Burden, AcCT.
TODAY, Nov. 27, 2006, at 14.
96. Anastasia O'Rourke, A New Politics of Engagement: Shareholder
Activism for Corporate Social Responsibility, 12 Bus. STRATEGY & ENV'T 227,
227-28 (2003); W. Trexler Proffitt, Jr. & Andrew Spicer, Shaping the
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Naturally, the success or failure of such strategies hinges on the
role that boards define for themselves. A board of directors that
adopts a more narrow interpretation of its function is less likely to
respond to interest group appeals because arguments for
environmental responsibility or sensitivity to the concerns of
overseas workers will be seen as beyond the scope of their
responsibility. On the other hand, boards with a more expansive
vision of their role may be open to such appeals, and, in turn, put
pressure on management to alter business practices. Thus, for
groups that view the board as a potential point of access through
which corporate policy can be altered, the definition of board role is
hardly an academic matter. For this reason, some activists have
argued that directors ought to take a more expansive view of their
own role.97 An alternative approach is to build a strategy that takes
a more conventional view of the board function and to find tools that
affect the company in ways that lie within an even more narrowly
defined sphere of director interest.
The non-state approach is seen as a means of overcoming
governmental inaction in many arenas. However, an unappreciated
and unintended consequence of relying upon market mechanisms
versus state-based regulation is the extent to which the board has a
role in formulating a corporate response.
Compliance with a
governmental regulatory requirement-whether its origins are
domestic or transnational-is unambiguously a matter of board
interest. Directors are responsible for ensuring that the company
adheres to all legal standards and certainly would hold management
responsible for failures to operate the company in a legal fashion.
However, the non-state approach does not rely upon the
imperative of regulation to sway corporate decision making but
rather invokes the logic of markets. The decision to adhere to the
requirements of a NSMD global-governance organization is, by
many accounts, beyond the purview of corporate directors. 98 This is
a critical difference between market-oriented and state-based
approaches that has not been considered by analysts of NSMD
regimes.
While legitimacy of such systems is an important issue, the
market logic of the NSMD system has an unintended drawback: it
keeps a firm's compliance decisions out of the hands of corporate
boards. Unlike regulatory requirements, which are clearly of great
concern to corporate directors, certification schemes pose a business-

ShareholderActivism Agenda: InstitutionalInvestors and Global Social Issues,
4 STRATEGIC ORG. 165 (2006); Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Responding to

Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies
8-9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-019, 2009), available at

http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-019.pdf.
97. Reid & Toffel, supra note 96, at 7.

98. See CASHORE ET AL., supra note 4, at 59-216.
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strategy decision, which is generally seen as the prerogative of
management. 99
The potential symbiotic role of NSMD systems would overcome
these challenges because it appeals on the basis of market and
regulatory logic. This opens the door to engagement by the board of
directors. From the perspective of shareholder activists who seek to
promote a social objective by influencing corporate directors, this is
an incredibly important advantage over stand-alone NSMD global
governance.
CONCLUSION

This examination of the Gold Standard's emergence and its path
to political legitimacy sheds light upon the complexities of NSMD
governance. It has highlighted the idea that government policy can
be advanced through the NSMD model. This represents a step
forward from the conventional understanding of NSMD systems
only as an alternative to state mechanisms or, even more
disparagingly, a fallback position when governmental action is
impossible. The Gold Standard experience shows that the NSMD
arrangement could even enhance the performance of state-centric
regimes. While additional research is needed to flesh out the
dynamics of such symbiotic relationships, this initial exploration
shows how a symbiotic approach could address pressing
environmental and social problems. To this end, we note that
scholarship on public policy, international relations, and private
authority must be increasingly integrated to understand better what
types of innovative policy baskets' 00 might be identified and assessed
for their potential to offer more effective and efficient approaches to
environmental governance.
With respect to the CDM in particular, our analysis reveals that
on a very basic level it can help build wider support and knowledge
of the Kyoto Protocol, as project planners without a need to meet
their own carbon targets become intimately involved in the
mechanics of the agreement in an effort to craft projects that will
appeal to those seeking credits. More profoundly, the CDM program
could be a catalyst for sustainable development, with the potential
to make cleaner technologies more competitive in the developing
world. It could promote private-sector engagement in developing
countries, lead to the creation of new energy infrastructure, spur
investment in small-scale projects (that offer sustainable
development benefits but are generally less appealing to foreign
investors), prompt dissemination of best practices, and encourage

99. See generally Erika Sasser et al., Direct Targeting as an NGO Political
Strategy: Examining PrivateAuthority Regimes in the Forestry Sector, 8 Bus. &
POL. 1 (2006).
100. GUNNINGHAM & GRABoSKY, supra note 77, at 4.
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capital flows in developing countries.1 01 Perhaps most importantly,
the CDM can demonstrate that sustainable development,
environmental improvement, and investment can be achieved in
tandem. 102 Given all these potential benefits, it is important to
determine whether a symbiotic relationship between a NSMD (Gold
Standard) system and an intergovernmental body increases the
likelihood of success. One might argue that the greatest benefit
offered by this symbiotic relationship is the opportunity to refine the
requirements without reopening the Kyoto rulebook and
renegotiating other aspects of the agreement.
Of course, with the Gold Standard in its nascent stages, it is
difficult to determine whether a stable symbiotic relationship will
emerge or what specific pathway it will follow.
The concern
associated with any NSMD system is that it does not reach beyond
its niche market in Phase I, or, perhaps even worse, that it causes
an unintended weakening of standards through Phase II
competition. As the Gold Standard model matures, researchers
should look for trends in both the voluntary and compliance
markets. In addition, the future of the CDM after 2012, when the
first compliance period of the Kyoto Protocol comes to a close, is
unresolved. An assessment of the future of the Gold Standard and
its ability to gain authority post-2012 could highlight the
implications of the symbiotic relationship.
Our
examination
demonstrates
that
a
symbiotic
government/NSMD relationship challenges existing ways in which
the
interaction
among
private
authority,
public
policy,
intergovernmental
relations,
and corporate
governance
is
conceptualized. If scholarship is to be advanced and if potentially
new and effective arrangements are to be understood, then greater
attention to such symbiosis seems warranted.

101.

CDM USER'S GUIDE, supra note 26, at 11; GOLD STANDARD QUALITY
supra note 36, at 3; Cosbey et al., supra note 32, at 1-2.
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